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Mark S. Williams 
Canada at War in the Pacific: 
The Case of Complex Neorealism 
Introduction 
In his seminal genealogy of international relations, Steve Smith (1995, 2) 
reminds his readers that "silences are the loudest voices" of a discipline. 
Similar to those of sociology on the Holocaust, the silences of international 
relations are found in the international itself. Derided as barbaric, irrational, 
and of course anarchic, international relations often fails to articulate the 
space of the international as socially constituted by interpretation and 
identity (2-3). This paper will attempt to address a number of the 
disciplinary silences of international relations, such as 1) those between 
international relations and foreign policy analysis, 2) Canadian foreign 
policy, traditionally analyzed only after the Second World War, and 3) the 
role of identity in international politics. The first section discusses the 
theory of complex neorealism as that which integrates international 
relations with foreign policy analysis, and will be applied to Canada during 
the Second World War. The second section is divided into two principal 
areas: 1 ) Mackenzie King and Canada entering the Second World War, and 
2) Canada's war in the Pacific in particular. The final section of this paper 
will consider the relevance of the English school of international politics 
both during the Second World War and after. This paper argues that the 
weakness of complex neorealism in explaining Canada's decision to 
declare war is principally due to the theory's failure to meaningfully 
incorporate identity into its framework. 
Complex Neorealism 
Canadian scholars have a tradition of integrating theories of international 
politics with Canada's foreign policy (Nossal 1997). David Dewitt and 
John Kirton offer a detailed modification of neorealism described as 
"complex neorealism" to integrate the theory of international relations 
neorealism with foreign policy analysis in the context of Canada. Complex 
neorealism applies to a state regarded as a "principal" power, analogous to 
the former Great Powers of the 19th century Concert of Europe. The 
components of complex neorealism are: 1 ) defence of national interests and 
promotion of distinctive values, 2) principal powers acting in concert with 
each other, and 3) principal powers acting to modify the international order 
to reflect their interests and values (Dewitt and Kirton 2007,37-38). These 
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aspects are justified by three main arguments presented by Dewitt and 
Kirton (1983, 5-7). 
The first justification is that complex neorealism is being introduced to a 
Canadian context that has historically consisted of a debate between liberal 
internationalists and peripheral dependency theorists. The second 
justification is that the three components of complex neorealism provide a 
theoretical depth useful for bridging international politics with Canadian 
foreign policy analysis. The final justification for the three aspects is that 
they can be engaged to decide which is the most convincing and temporally 
robust for the student of Canadian foreign policy. 
Kirton explicitly maintains that the theory of complex neorealism was 
dominant in Canadian foreign policy during the 1960s, in Trudeau 's first 
term and when Canadian aid was first being directed toward francophone 
countries (2007, 29-30; Dewitt and Kirton 2007, 34). However, complex 
neorealism is also used as a theory to explain Canadian foreign policy prior 
to the late 1960s. The Second World War receives very little attention in 
either of Kirton's textbooks. Both clearly state they are concerned with the 
postwar order, but complex neorealism is the salient theory used to explain 
Canada's foreign policy. Dewitt and Kirton suggest that Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King's decisions to enter the Second World War and contribute 
to the Allied war effort are indicative of Canadian support for Great Britain 
and the maintenance of the global balance of power (1983,13,320). Kirton 
suggests that support for Great Britain was not primarily due to the 
Canadian identity in the Commonwealth, but was power politics containing 
"the seeds of the complex neo-realist pattern of Canadian foreign policy" 
(2007,48). 
Kim Richard Nossal posits that Dewitt and Kirton acknowledge the 
relevance of domestic actors in their discussions on complex neorealism, 
yet they do so only in passing. The theory, while suggesting a role for 
domestic actors regarding international politics, ultimately fails to 
meaningfully contribute to the state-centrism typified by realist literature 
(2007,169). Nossal's critique of Dewitt and Kirton focuses on the tension 
within complex neorealism of the avowedly statist orientation of the theory 
with its influence from Stephen Krasner, and the putative salience of 
domestic actors hesitantly acknowledged by Dewitt and Kirton. How social 
factors like identity can be integrated with the statism of complex 
neorealism is a silence of the theory that becomes problematic in the 
discussion on Canada leading up to and during the Second World War. 
The next section of this study will first discuss Canada's entry into the 
Second World War in general, and then treat Canada's role in the Pacific as a 
case study. While the Second World War is not discussed in great detail by 
Dewitt or Kirton, justification of it as an appropriate subject for inquiry 
regarding complex neorealism might be emphasized on two levels: 1) the 
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war is suggested as the starting point of complex neorealism in later 
Canadian foreign policy, 2) the war is significant, both for those Canadians 
who fought and died and in having shaped Canadian foreign policy in the 
postwar period. 
Mackenzie King's War 
Canada declared war on Nazi Germany on 10 September 1939 and later on 
the Empire of Japan on 8 December 1941. The subsequent section will 
consider Canada's war in the Pacific, but will provide the context for the 
discussion on the war against Japan by first discussing the worldview of 
Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and the context of Canada's 
entry into the war. It will be argued that Mackenzie King's entry of Canada 
into the war must be interpreted by considering both the normative 
dimension of his view of international politics and the importance of 
identity. 
The Normative Argument 
To appreciate the worldview of Mackenzie King, one must consider the 
normative argument for a global society that is repeated during the interwar 
period as well as during the Second World War. In an address on citizenship 
given in August 1925, Mackenzie King discussed Canada's national unity, 
its role in the British Empire, and the question of the League of Nations. 
Mackenzie King's argument was that Canada must embrace all three of its 
duties: national citizenship, empire citizenship, and world citizenship 
(1927, 150). He propounded a broader international participation for 
Canada because "in a world which has become one, we cannot live unto 
ourselves" (145). Canada was encouraged to have an international role to 
promote a more just world order: "The world's security lies in having like 
ideas and ideals made to prevail over as wide areas as may be possible" 
(ibid.). 
The normative reflections of Mackenzie King are a strong rebuttal to 
complex neorealism's assertion of the primacy of power politics defining 
Canada's entry into the Second World War. It is power politics that 
Mackenzie King blames for the outbreak of the war. In a diary entry dated 
28 September 193 8, before the Munich Crisis, Mackenzie King wrote about 
the nature of European power politics being expressed and about a 
pejorative charge that he was "chivalrous": 
To be influenced by this judgement would be equivalent to 
admitting that material interests could be greater than moral 
interests of [sic] spiritual. I will never descent [sic] in to that pit. I 
would be quite prepared to sacrifice my own life at the head of the 
nation, than to see it buried in a materialistic slough, or bowing 
before a brutal God of Fear and Force. 
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Mackenzie King's distaste of power politics is further evident in a vision 
he said he experienced between 6:00 and 8:00 in the morning on the eve of 
war with Germany. The latter part of the vision involved Ralston, Canada's 
minister of national defence, standing in a room where, opposite, two men 
were shot. Mackenzie King believed that the appearance of Ralston 
represented Canada's victory in the war due to both the country's finance 
and the "finest of Canada's effort" — that is, chivalry (King Diaries, 8 
September 1939). 
In his address to the House of Commons on 8 December 1939 to win 
support for the coming declaration of war, Mackenzie King equated the 
defence of Canada and Great Britain with freedom (1941, 7). For 
responsibility of the war, he quoted Hitler at length, demonstrating how 
Hitler attempted to justify peace in Europe through a political philosophy of 
power and domination. Mackenzie King argued that force was capable of 
achieving "nothing," and that Europe would only experience peace by 
cultivating an international system that resembled more of an integrated 
society (20-23). 
The Nazis and the Japanese, in contrast, represented "those who 
worshipped] material power" (King 1944,216). The Third Reich and the 
"co-prosperity sphere" of imperial Japan were derided by Mackenzie King 
as systems of inequality both between races and within them (205). The 
portrayal of the struggle against Nazi Germany and the Empire of Japan as a 
battle between slavery and freedom was a recurring theme in Mackenzie 
King's speeches, along with the reference to Abraham Lincoln's famous 
quotation from the Gospels that a house divided could not stand (23-26, 
205). Mackenzie King broadened Lincoln's context from that of a 
half-enslaved, half-free country to the world: a world both half-enslaved 
and half-free cannot endure. 
Identity 
Mackenzie King articulated ideas of multiple and cohabiting identities: 
national, North American, British, and global society. For him, all four 
were intrinsically interconnected; they will thus be discussed in relation to 
each other. Canadian national unity was important, not in the context of a 
realist formulation of Canada's national interest as interpreted by power 
politics, but in the context of the debate on conscription. Keenly aware of 
the Anglophone-Francophone tension precipitated by conscription during 
the First World War, King wanted to make electoral promises regarding any 
future conscription during the Second World War (King Diaries, 3 
February 1940; Pickersgill 1960, 22; King 1944, 10). 
The North American identity is articulated by Mackenzie King in three 
speeches given to American audiences between 1909 and 1927. The 
speeches refer to the "one hundred years of peace" that Canada and the 
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United States had been able to maintain since the War of 1812. This lasting 
continental peace had been achieved by the active engagement and 
commitment to peace of policy makers responsible for the Rush-Bagot 
Agreement of 1817 and the International Joint Commission of 1911, but 
more importantly because of the "community of interests, ideals, and 
aspirations" that had made "Reason supreme over Force" (King 1927,166, 
172,176). Mackenzie King suggested that the durable peace that had been 
held between Canada and the United States could be an example to the 
world and a goal Europe could aspire to (165): "This is the great 
object-lesson which we of the New World have to give to those who come to 
us from the Old" (176). The North American identity Mackenzie King 
advocated in his three afore-mentioned speeches was intrinsically an 
"English-speaking" one with Canada representing the British Empire 
(177-78). The North American identity was inherently connected to the 
British Empire and later to the Commonwealth, and was the ultimate reason 
Canada declared war on Nazi Germany in 1939. 
Before the war, Mackenzie King famously remarked to Adolph Hitler 
"that if Germany should ever turn her mind from constructive to destructive 
efforts against the United Kingdom all the Dominions would come to her 
aid and that there would be great numbers of Canadians anxious to swim the 
Atlantic" (Granatstein 1990, 2). Mackenzie King claimed that his 
admonition was not "the automatic response to some mechanical 
organization of Empire" (1944,3) but rather a declaration of war based on 
an identity of the new world and the British Empire: "Canada is a nation of 
the New World. As a nation of the New World, we placed ourselves at 
Britain's side because Britain's cause was the cause of freedom, not in this 
island alone, not in the British Empire alone, not in the Old World alone, but 
everywhere in the world" {ibid.). 
In the same address given in London, England, in 1941, Mackenzie King 
related the conflict to the Book of Revelations, in which the old world 
destroys itself and the new world order is based on the successful peace of 
the new world and its promotion of common ideals throughout humanity 
(11-12). 
Avery brief review of secondary sources on Canada in the Second World 
War largely supports the argument of identity outlined here. James Eayrs 
( 1975,194) stresses the moral superiority of the new world compared to the 
old world of Europe among the Canadian public generally and especially 
with reference to Mackenzie King. J.L. Granatstein (1990) argues that 
Canada entered into the war with its colonial ties to Britain largely intact, 
and emerged after the war as a fully independent state. Granatstein 
emphasizes that Canadian nationalism did not exist prior to the war, but 
rather was a force that Mackenzie King shaped and directed during the 
fighting. According to Granatstein, Canada did not enter the war to defeat 
Nazism, anti-Semitism, or to free Europe: "Canada was in the war out of a 
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sense of duty, not because her own national interests were directly 
threatened" (42). Despite Mackenzie King's concerns regarding national 
unity and his suspicions surrounding Great Britain, Canada went to war 
because Britain was at war. 
The War in the Pacific 
Canada's involvement in the Pacific War has not been the subject of much 
scholarly scrutiny, nor was it even reported much in the news media of the 
time. However, it can be divided into three main sections: 1 ) Hong Kong, 2) 
the Aleutian Islands, and 3) the negotiations of Canada's contribution 
leading up to Okinawa. Canada's involvement in the Pacific War must be 
interpreted in the context of the country's entry on the European stage two 
years earlier. 
Hong Kong 
Canada's declaration of war on Japan, issued on 8 December 1941, was 
different from the declaration against Germany issued over two years 
previously, yet it was within the same context. As mentioned earlier, 
Canada declared war against Germany because Great Britain had just 
declared war. The country then declared war against Japan because her 
soldiers garrisoned on Hong Kong had been attacked on 7 December. As a 
British colony, Hong Kong was garrisoned by British forces, and in 1940 
Canada had been asked, to send soldiers. The events leading to the 
deployment of Canadian troops in Hong Kong are not entirely clear, but 
they began with Major General A.E. Grasett, former general officer of the 
British Hong Kong outpost, who was travelling through Canada on his 
return to Britain. Grasett met with the chief of the Canadian general staff, 
Major General H.D.G. Crerar, to petition the addition of two or more 
Canadian battalions to reinforce the outpost at Hong Kong. The 
correspondence between high-level Canadian officials and their British 
counterparts on Hong Kong significantly downplayed the danger the 
Empire of Japan represented to the outpost, and made the decision based on 
political and moral reasoning rather than questioning the military danger 
troops would be exposed to on Hong Kong (Vincent 1981, 39-43). 
Ultimately, two battalions were selected to be deployed to the ill-fated 
island, representing both eastern and western Canada: the Winnipeg 
Grenadiers and the Royal Rifles of Canada, totalling 1,975 soldiers. These 
troops had previously been garrisoned in the West Indies and 
Newfoundland. The inquiry of the Hong Kong Commission on the battle 
readiness of these troops has been highly criticized (36-37). 
In three of his diary entries (3 July 1940 and 15 and 16 November 1941 ), 
Mackenzie King equated the contribution of Canadian soldiers to Hong 
Kong with the defence of Canada. Despite the shelling of Estevan Point on 
Vancouver Island by a Japanese submarine on June 21, 1941, Canada's 
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sovereignty was not seriously threatened at this time. Soldiers were sent to 
Hong Kong because the British Empire was being explicitly threatened by 
Japan. The urgency of the British request for soldiers to garrison Hong 
Kong in 1940 was enough for troops to be sent to the Pacific and even 
threatened a conscription crisis in Parliament (Pickersgill 1960, 315-17). 
While the Japanese had declared war on both the United States and the 
British Empire, attacking Hong Kong and Pearl Harbour on the same day, 
Mackenzie King made clear that it was the attack on Great Britain that 
directly led to Canada's own declaration of war (298). 
Aleutian Islands Campaign 
The Aleutian Islands campaign represents the second stage in Canada's 
contribution to the war in the Pacific. In early June 1942, the Japanese 
attacked the islands Attu and Kiska off Alaska. Following nine months of 
Japanese occupation, the Allies first invaded Attu Island and then Kiska 
Island three months later, the latter assault including a sizeable contingent 
comprised of almost 5,500 Canadian soldiers (Roehrs and Renzi 2004, 
116-17). In Mackenzie King's speech to the Canadian public a week after 
the landings on Kiska, he discussed how most of the Canadian war effort 
was concentrated in the European and Atlantic theatres. He admitted that 
most Canadians were not even aware of the battles in the Pacific and that 
even "the defence of this continent against Japanese aggression [was] 
comparatively little known" (King 1944, 261). After the Japanese had 
launched their original assaults on Alaska, Roosevelt asked Mackenzie 
King whether public opinion in British Columbia was at all concerned with 
the Japanese attacks. Mackenzie King dismissed Roosevelt's query and 
they both agreed that British defeats in Egypt and Hitler's invasion of 
Russia were higher priorities (Pickersgill 1960, 415). 
While Canadian forces in the European theatre experienced by far the 
heaviest casualties, these losses were more easily accepted and identifiable 
as necessary for the preservation of freedom compared with those losses 
suffered in the Pacific War. The Hong Kong disaster, on the other hand, 
quickly precipitated the establishment of a commission to investigate 
political and military negligence. The raid on Dieppe resulted in far more 
casualties, but no comparable commission was instituted to investigate 
incompetence. 
What perhaps most reveals the low importance attached to Canada's 
contribution to the Aleutian Islands campaign is the use of Canadian forces 
conscripted under the National Mobilization Act. To avoid a national unity 
crisis over conscription, Mackenzie King promised that the soldiers drawn 
into service by the National Mobilization Act would not be used as combat 
troops. The decision to send conscripted Canadian troops to the Aleutian 
Islands was not made by Mackenzie King; he was not even notified of the 
decision until the troops were already en route to Alaska and could not be 
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called back. Even after the contributions of those Canadian forces were 
announced to the public, there was no measurable political public outcry. 
Canadians were not following the Pacific campaign and were instead 
distracted by the participation of Canadian forces in the Allied invasion of 
Sicily (Pickersgill 1960, 515-17). 
Build-up to Okinawa 
The Canadian contribution to the Pacific after the Aleutian Islands 
campaign can be considered a military interregnum akin to Canada's 
military contribution during the first year after the declaration of war 
against Germany. The period between September 1943 and March 1945 is 
best represented by Canada's lack of participation in the war in the Pacific. 
This can be understood as both a sense of unwillingness of the part of 
Canada and a lack of urgency of the part of the Allies to induce Canada to 
participate. 
Mackenzie King's position during Allied meetings of the war cabinets to 
discuss the Pacific was that Canada would not actively contribute combat 
troops for three principal reasons. The first was that Britain and the United 
States wished to reclaim territory lost to the Japanese, such as Singapore for 
the British and the Philippines for the Americans, which had nothing to do 
with Canada (Pickersgill and Forster 1968, 62). The second reason is 
illustrated in the introduction to the second volume of The Mackenzie King 
Record. Pickersgill and Forster contend that the focus for the Canadians, in 
contrast to that of the Americans, was absorbed by the campaign in Europe 
(9). Mackenzie King was clearly very conscious of the apathy of Canadians 
regarding the Pacific. To compensate, the prime minister very rarely 
publicly discussed Japan without a reference to Germany or Europe. His 
aim was to link the Axis powers as closely as possible and to overstate the 
cooperation and mutual goals of Japan and Germany, to blur the distinction 
between Europe, where Canadian identity was strong, and the Pacific, 
where the identity of Canada was much weaker (350-51). The prime 
minister's final reason for not contributing more combat troops was simply 
that he wanted to keep Canadian troops concentrated in Europe; he did not 
want to have to conscript more forces because of the war against Japan. 
Mackenzie King would not commit combat troops to the Pacific 
campaign until the war moved north of the equator. The Mackenzie King 
Record states that this is because Canadians believed that the war in the 
Pacific was an imperial conflict for the British and Americans (Pickersgill 
and Forster 1968, 73-79). This final point demonstrates both the strength 
and the weakness of Canadian identity with Great Britain. Canadian forces 
were in the Pacific originally because Great Britain had requested Canadian 
forces. However, support for the Commonwealth did not equate with 
support for the Empire. Canada's identity as a state without colonial 
interests created a lack of support for the imperial interests of Great Britain 
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in the South1 Pacific. While Canadian naval forces continued to have a 
presence in the Pacific during the war as small contingents attached to 
British regiments, such as in Burma and Sumatra, it was not until the Battle 
of Okinawa, in which Canadian naval and air forces neutralized the 
Japanese airfields in the nearby Sakishima Islands, that Canada became an 
active contributor to the Allied effort in the Pacific. 
Discussion 
As mentioned earlier, Canada entered the war against Nazi Germany 
because Great Britain entered the war, not out of an analytical calculation of 
self-interest or a desire on the part of Mackenzie King to engage in 
European power politics ascribed to Canada by complex neorealism. 
Rather, the context of Canada's declaration of war must be understood in 
relation to Mackenzie King's identity of Canada as bound to the 
Commonwealth and Great Britain, and his normative understanding of 
international politics and Canada's role as a part of a "New World" in which 
peace and interest was institutionalized to an international society, in 
juxtaposition to the "Old World" of European diplomacy and balance of 
power. The case study of the Pacific campaign during the Second World 
War elucidates Canada's involvement as a direct consequence of British 
influence, but also demonstrates the lack of a strong attachment of the 
Pacific. Britain's colonial possessions were not included as part of the new 
world to be defended by Canada, and were perhaps understood as outside of 
the international society of North America and the Commonwealth. 
The relevance of this study is not isolated to the Second World War but 
continues into the postwar period. In his "Foundations of Canadian Policy 
in World Affairs" Grey Lecture, Louis St. Laurent discusses both the 
importance of Canadian national unity and the international society of the 
non-communist and specifically Christian world. It is also difficult to 
interpret the years of "Pearsonianism" without some discussion on the 
international society Pearson attempted to moderate during crises such as 
Suez and Cyprus. 
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